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The Pich Exception: Reservations, Exceptions to 
Warranty, and Exceptions to Grant in the Chain of 
Title. 
Zackary D. Callarman 
INTRODUCTION 
Attorneys and landmen alike encounter mineral reservations and 
exceptions on a daily basis. While the terms “reservation” and “exception” 
are not strictly synonymous, there are circumstances where an exception 
and reservation achieve the same result (e.g., an interest is retained by the 
grantor of the instrument).1 Generally, a reservation is the creation of a 
new right or interest, by and for the grantor, in real property being granted 
to another.2 On the other hand, the term exception has two definitions: (1) 
a description of a portion of the thing granted, which prior to the grant had 
been conveyed to another, and not necessarily so conveyed by the grantor, 
but by a prior grantor, or (2) the retention of an existing right or interest, 
by and for the grantor, in real property being granted to another.3 When 
the language in question is construed as an “exception to warranty,” the 
grantor will never retain the excepted interest. However, where the 
language in question is construed as an “exception to grant,” the grantor 
will retain the excepted interest if another party does not own said interest. 
A competent title examiner must be able to discern the difference between 
a reservation, exception to warranty, and an exception to grant, as the 
consequence of mistaking one for the other could lead to malpractice 
liability. This article examines Texas jurisprudence and aims to provide 
rule-based guidance to attorneys and landmen for interpreting reservation 
and exception provisions in the chain of title. 
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1. See, e.g., Pich v. Lankford, 302 S.W.2d 645, 650 (Tex. 1957) (citing
Donnell v. Otts, 230 S.W. 864, 865 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921). 
2. Reservation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
3. Exception, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
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DISCUSSION 
First, the following analysis will present a basic explanation of 
reservations and exceptions, as defined by Texas law. Thereafter, these 
basic definitions will gradually evolve pursuant to the distinguishing facts 
of each case examined. 
A. Texas Courts Do Not Favor Reservations by Implication 
Sharp v. Fowler is among the most widely cited Texas cases 
addressing mineral estate reservations.4 There, the Supreme Court of 
Texas stated two important rules that are universally followed by courts 
addressing the issue today: (1) a reservation of minerals must be by clear 
language in order to be effective; and (2) courts do not favor reservations 
by implication.5 In Sharp, Frost Lumber Industries, Inc. (Frost) conveyed 
29.7 acres out of the Texas Central Railway Survey No. 13 to A.D. 
Cockrell (Cockrell) on February 4, 1935, excepting all of the minerals, 
which were owned by Louis Werner Sawmill Company (Werner) at the 
time (hereinafter referred to as the Frost Deed).6 Subsequently, Werner 
conveyed all of the minerals to Frost, who then conveyed all of the 
minerals to Cockrell.7 Next, Cockrell conveyed a three-fourths mineral 
interest to another party, such that he then owned all of the surface and an 
undivided one-fourth mineral interest.8 Thereafter, Cockrell died, and the 
administrator of Cockrell’s estate conveyed said 29.7 acre tract to J.A. 
Browning, describing the subject lands as: “29.7 acres of the T.C. Railway 
Company No. 13, and being the same land described in a deed from 
[Frost], to A.D. Cockrell, dated the 4th day of February, A.D. 1935, and of 
record in Vol. 102, Page 462, Deed Records, Panola County, Texas” 
(hereinafter referred to as the Administrator’s Deed).9 
The successors-in-interest to Cockrell’s estate, the petitioners, argued 
that the Administrator’s Deed conveyed only the surface to Browning, 
reasoning that the Frost Deed, which was utilized for the legal description 
in the Administrator’s Deed, conveyed only the surface.10 Conversely, 
respondents, successors-in-interest to Browning, argued that the 
Administrator’s Deed did not expressly except or reserve any mineral 
                                                                                                             
 4. 252 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. 1952). 
 5. Id. at 154 (citing Sellers v. Tex. Cent. Ry. Co., 17 S.W. 32 (Tex. 1891); 
State v. Black Bros., 297 S.W. 213 (Tex. 1927)). 
 6. Sharp, 252 S.W.2d at 153. 
 7. Id. at 154. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Sharp v. Fowler, 252 S.W.2d 153, 153–54 (Tex. 1952). 
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interest and that any mineral interest owned by the grantor passed to the 
grantee of the Deed.11 
Ultimately, the court was asked to determine whether the use of the 
Frost Deed to describe the lands conveyed operated to transfer a lesser 
estate than Cockrell owned at the time of the conveyance.12 In other words, 
the question was whether the reference to the Frost Deed was a description 
of the estate being conveyed to Browning, or merely a geographical 
description of the land being conveyed. 
Importantly, the court noted that the Administrator’s Deed conveyed 
29.7 acres, “‘being the same land described in’ the Frost Deed,” explaining 
that to describe land is to define its physical location so that it may be 
located on the ground, rather than a definition of the estate conveyed by 
the Deed.13 However, the court explained that if the clause in the 
Administrator’s Deed transferred the same “land conveyed in the Frost 
Deed,” the outcome would have been different.14 Noting that the language 
in the Administrator’s Deed did not evidence an intention to reserve the 
one-fourth mineral interest that the Estate owned at the time of 
conveyance, the court concluded that the interest passed to the grantee, 
and ultimately vested in the Respondents.15 
B. Klein Court Holds that Exception of Interest Identical to Previously 
Reserved Interest was Included Only as an Exception to Warranty 
When the provision in question expresses an intent only to except a 
previously reserved interest, Texas courts will construe the provision as an 
exception to warranty and will not credit the grantor with ownership of the 
excepted interest.16 Such was the case in Klein v. Humble Oil & Refining 
Co., where by warranty deed dated May 29, 1928, Robert Stein and his 
wife conveyed a tract of land to F.F. Klein (hereinafter the Stein Deed) 
with the following reservation: 
Grantors herein, however, reserve for themselves, their heirs and 
assigns, one-eighth (1/8) of all mineral rights in and under [ten] 
acres of land, running north and south, on the east end of the 
[sixty] acres herein conveyed, and it is understood and agreed that 
if no production of oil is had on said [ten] acres within a period of 
11. Id. at 153–54.
12. Id. at 154.
13. Id. at 154 (emphasis added).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Klein v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 67 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. Civ.
App.–Beaumont 1934, writ granted), aff’d, 86 S.W.2d 1077 (Tex. 1935). 
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[twenty] years, this reservation shall terminate and become null 
and void, and it is further understood that grantors herein are not 
to participate in any oil lease or rental bonuses that may be paid 
on any lease on said above described land, and hereby waive any 
rights they may have or be entitled to in any future oil or gas 
lease.17 
Subsequently, by warranty deed dated July 16, 1928, F.F. Klein and his 
wife conveyed the same tract of land to D.D. Baker (hereinafter the Klein 
Deed) with the following provisions: 
There is however excepted from this conveyance [one-eighth] of all 
mineral rights in and under [t]en acres of land running north and south 
on the east end of said [sixty] acres, and it is understood that if no 
production of oil is had on said [ten] acres within a period of [t]wenty 
years from May 29, 1928, then this reservation shall lapse. Also 
understood that the owner of said rights is not to participate in any oil 
lease or rental bonuses that may be paid for any lease, and have no 
interest in any future oil and gas lease . . . . The property herein 
conveyed is the same conveyed to us by Robert Stein and wife by 
deed dated May 29, 1928, and recorded in Guadalupe County, Deed 
Record Book 97, p. 398.18 
Thereafter, when oil was discovered on the subject lands, Klein, 
believing that he owned a one-eighth mineral interest in the subject lands 
pursuant to the above provision, began conveying portions of the mineral 
interest to various other parties.19 Next, after acquiring an oil and gas lease 
covering the interest of Stein and his successors-in-interest, the Humble 
Company (Humble) began producing oil and gas from the lands; however, 
Humble did not pay Klein and his successors-in-interest for the one-eighth 
interest that he claimed he owned.20 As a result, Klein brought suit against 
Humble, claiming that he excepted in himself an undivided one-eighth 
mineral interest in the deed from him to Baker and was thus due his share 
of the lease benefits.21 At trial, the court denied Klein any recovery, and 
Klein subsequently appealed.22 
On appeal, the court first explained that the cardinal rule in deed 
construction cases is to ascertain the intention of the parties from an 
17. Id. at 912.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 913.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Klein v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 67 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Tex. Civ. App.–
Beaumont 1934, writ granted), aff’d, 86 S.W.2d 1077 (Tex. 1935). 
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examination of the entire instrument.23 The court further cited two 
common canons of construction, noting that: (1) any doubt as to the 
language of the deed will be resolved against the grantor and in favor of 
the grantee (the Construe Against the Grantor Rule); and (2) that a deed 
will be construed as passing the entire fee-simple estate unless there are 
express words limiting the estate conveyed (the Greatest Estate Rule).24 In 
addition, though noting that an exception and reservation may sometimes 
achieve the same result, the court distinguished the two.25 It explained that 
a reservation must always be in favor of the grantor, while an exception is 
a mere exclusion from the grant and is in favor of the grantor only if the 
excepted interest is not owned by another party.26 
Next, the court emphasized the location of the granting paragraph and 
exception paragraph in the Klein Deed, respectively, explaining that Klein 
first conveyed “all that certain tract of land” (including a legal description 
of the land conveyed), followed by a separate paragraph laying out the 
exception of a one-eighth term mineral interest.27 The court reasoned that 
the legal effect of the structure of the Klein Deed was to: (1) convey a fee-
simple estate in all of the subject lands except a one-eighth mineral 
interest; and (2) provide warranty to the grantee covering the entire subject 
lands except the one-eighth mineral interest.28 
The court then dissected the language of the exception provision in the 
Klein Deed by contrasting it with the language of the reservation provision 
in the Stein Deed. While the grantors in the Stein Deed “reserve[d] for 
themselves,” the Klein Deed merely stated that a one-eighth interest was 
“excepted from this conveyance,” which evidenced that Klein did not 
intend to retain an interest in favor of himself.29 
In addition, the fact that Stein reserved a twenty year term mineral 
interest from the date of the Stein Deed (May 29, 1928) was a factor in the 
court’s analysis. While the Stein Deed reserved the one-eighth interest for 
a period of twenty years, the Klein Deed (dated July 26, 1928) excepted 
the one-eighth interest for “a period of twenty years from May 29, 1928,” 
which was the date of the Stein Deed, and was evidence that Klein 
intended only to except Stein’s prior term interest for warranty purposes.30 
Further, the Stein Deed reservation provided that the “grantors herein are 
23. Id. at 914.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 915.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 914–15.
28. Klein v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 67 S.W.2d 911, 915–16 (Tex. Civ.
App.–Beaumont 1934, writ granted), aff’d, 86 S.W.2d 1077 (Tex. 1935). 
29. Id. at 916.
30. Id.
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not to participate in any oil lease,” while the Klein Deed exception 
provided that “the owner of said rights is not to participate in any oil 
lease.”31 This, according to the court, was further evidence that Klein was 
excepting only the rights that were owned by another party (Stein) to 
protect Klein on his warranty to Baker.32 
Lastly, the court highlighted the provision following the exception 
provision in the Klein Deed to support its ultimate conclusion. The 
provision identifies the lands conveyed by Klein to Baker as being “the 
same conveyed to us by Robert Stein and wife,” and includes a reference 
to the recording information for the Stein Deed.33 According to the court, 
the effect of this reference was to clarify the intention of the parties.34 In 
other words, this clause indicated that Klein intended to convey to Baker 
the identical lands and interest that Klein received from Stein, being the 
subject lands less a one-eighth mineral interest.35 Ultimately, the court 
explained that if Klein intended to retain a one-eighth mineral interest in 
the lands, he would have expressed that intent prominently in the disputed 
provision.36 After noting the absence of an express intent to reserve the 
mineral interest, the court concluded that Klein did not retain any interest 
in the subject lands.37 
C. The Pich Exception–A False Recital Will Not Operate to Nullify a 
Clear Exception from the Conveyance 
Where a deed includes a clear and unambiguous exception followed 
by a “false recital” purporting to state why the exception is made, the 
provision will be construed as excepting an interest in favor of the grantor 
if said interest is not owned by another party.38 Generally, a recital is 
defined as a formal statement included in a deed or writing to explain the 
reasons upon which the transaction is founded.39 The recital is a “false 
recital” when the parties to the instrument include the recital in error.40 
31. Id. (emphasis added).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 913–14.
34. Klein v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 67 S.W.2d 911, 915–16 (Tex. Civ.
App.–Beaumont 1934, writ granted), aff’d, 86 S.W.2d 1077 (Tex. 1935). 
35. Id. at 916.
36. Id. at 917.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Pich v. Lankford, 302 S.W.2d 645, 648 (Tex. 1957).
39. 4 ALOYSIUS A. LEOPOLD, TEXAS PRACTICE SERIES: LAND TITLES AND 
TITLE EXAMINATION § 21.10 (3rd ed. 2005). 
40. 4 ALOYSIUS A. LEOPOLD, TEXAS PRACTICE SERIES: LAND TITLES AND 
TITLE EXAMINATION § 16.10 (3rd ed. 2005). 
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In Pich v. Lankford, L.A. Pich conveyed the subject lands to F.D. 
Turner on September 28, 1928, reserving “one[-]half of the full [one-
eighth] [o]il [r]oyalty, or a [one-sixteenth] of all minerals produced on said 
land.”41 Next, on May 20, 1929, Turner conveyed the subject lands to 
Lewis B. Adams with no exceptions or reservations.42 Then, on February 
27, 1930, Adams conveyed the subject lands to S.J. Higgs, reserving 
“one[-]fourth of all royalty, the same being [one thirty-second]1/32 of all 
oil and gas produced from said land.”43 Frank S. Magers, administrator of 
S.J. Higgs’s estate, conveyed all of the estate’s right, title and interest in 
the subject lands to Collins Howard on October 18, 1941, with no 
exceptions or reservations.44 
Subsequently, on January 26, 1943, Howard conveyed the subject 
lands to W.J. Sharp and his wife, Emma E. Sharp (hereinafter the Howard 
Deed).45 The Howard Deed included the following language: “Save and 
Except an undivided three-fourths of the oil, gas and other minerals in, on 
and under said land, which have been heretofore reserved.”46 On 
September 26, 1947, the Sharps conveyed the subject lands to A.H. and 
B.L. Lankford (hereinafter the Sharp Deed).47 The Sharp Deed contained 
the following provision: “Save and Except an undivided three-fourths of 
the oil, gas and other minerals in and under the Southwest Quarter thereof, 
and an undivided one-fourth of the minerals in and under the remainder of 
said survey, which minerals do not belong to the grantors herein.”48 
Thereafter, on November 15, 1955, Howard quitclaimed to L.A. Pich all 
right, title and interest in the three-fourths mineral interest excepted and 
reserved in the deed from Howard to Sharp.49 On December 12, 1955, 
Sharp quitclaimed to L.A. Pich all right, title and interest in the three-
fourths mineral interest excepted and reserved in the deed from Sharp to 
Lankford.50 
Finally, Lankford, the original plaintiff, sued Pich et al., arguing that 
the grantors’ intent in the Howard and Sharp Deeds was to convey all 
interest owned by the grantors and that the language in those deeds did not 
reserve any interest in favor of the grantors.51 In addition, Lankford 
asserted that the exception language in the Howard and Sharp Deeds 
41. Pich, 302 S.W.2d at 646.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Pich v. Lankford, 302 S.W.2d 645, 646 (Tex. 1957).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 646–47.
50. Pich v. Lankford, 302 S.W.2d 645, 647 (Tex. 1957).
51. Id.
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created a “cloud on [plaintiff]’s title” and sought to have the cloud on title 
removed.52 Ultimately, the trial court ruled that Lankford was the owner 
of the entire mineral estate, less the previously reserved royalty interests.53 
On appeal, the Amarillo Court of Civil Appeals, citing Klein, affirmed the 
trial court’s judgment; however, Pich’s subsequent writ of error to the 
Supreme Court of Texas was granted.54 
On review, Pich argued that: (1) the effect of the language in the 
Howard and Sharp Deeds was to except an undivided three-fourths 
mineral interest from the grant; (2) the fact that a false reason may have 
been given for the exception does not alter the effect of the exception; (3) 
said interest was necessarily retained by the grantor because no one else 
in the chain of title owned it; and (4) he owned said interest as the 
successor-in-interest to Howard and Sharp.55 Contrarily, Lankford argued 
that neither Howard nor Sharp intended to retain a mineral interest in their 
respective deeds, but rather inserted the exception provisions to account 
for the previously reserved royalty interests and thus to protect themselves 
for warranty purposes.56 
In its analysis, the court began by noting that a mineral interest and a 
royalty interest are distinct interests in land.57 Moreover, the court 
explained that an interest in land excepted from the grant will not pass to 
the grantee.58 After reflecting upon the specific language of the disputed 
provisions in the Howard and Sharp Deeds, the court reasoned that instead 
of excepting only such interests as “have heretofore been reserved” or that 
“do not belong to the grantors herein,” each deed expressly excepted an 
undivided three-fourths mineral interest in plain and unambiguous 
language.59 The court further stated that each exception was followed by a 
recital that purported to explain why the interest was excepted.60 Recalling 
that there were no prior mineral reservations in the chain of title—there 
were only royalty reservations—the court identified the recitals in the 
Howard and Sharp Deeds as “false recitals.”61 Citing Roberts v. Robertson, 
a Vermont Supreme Court case, the court adduced that including a false 
reason for an exception from the grant will not diminish the effect of the 
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 647–48.
56. Pich v. Lankford, 302 S.W.2d 645, 648 (Tex. 1957).
57. Id. (citing Richardson v. Hart, 185 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1945)).
58. Id. (citing King v. First Nat’l Bank of Wichita Falls, 192 S.W.2d 260, 262
(Tex. 1946)). 
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. (emphasis added).
2017] THE PICH EXCEPTION 53 
exception or operate to vest the grantee of the deed with the excepted 
interest.62 
Though not binding, Roberts exemplified the court’s logic in Pich and 
bears noting. In Roberts, the grantor, J.C. Roberts, conveyed several 
specifically identified tracts of land, with the following provision: “Said 
J.C. Roberts reserving lots sold, Nos. 1, 2, 3, [ . . . ] 32, 33.”63 While the 
majority of the enumerated lots listed in the provision had been sold, lots 
32 and 33 had not. There, the court held that the effect of the structure of 
the provision above was to except lots 32 and 33 from the grant, despite 
the fact that said lots had not been previously sold.64 In other words, the 
false recital that lots 32 and 33 had been previously sold did not alter the 
fact that lots 32 and 33 were excepted from the grant, and were not 
conveyed to the grantee by the deed. The court further noted that the result 
of the case would have been different if the provision instead stated, “I 
except all the lots heretofore sold,” as such would indicate only an 
exception to warranty.65 
The Pich court next cited its holding in Umscheid v. Scholz to further 
support its reasoning.66 In that case, the deed at issue conveyed a tract of 
land with the following provision: “[I]t being understood that the public 
thoroughfare formerly existing along the edge of the river at this point is 
not intended to be conveyed by these presents, the corporation of the [C]ity 
of Bexar having the right to open said thoroughfare when it sees fit.”67 
Thereafter, the successors-in-interest to the grantee in the above-
referenced deed claimed title to lands that were previously used as a 
thoroughfare.68 Though noting that there was no evidence that the City had 
the right to open said thoroughfare, the court in Scholz determined that: 
(1) the exception was not affected by the false recital; (2) the land was 
effectively excepted from the grant; and (3) said land did not pass to the 
grantee of the deed.69 
Returning to the facts of Pich, the court rejected Lankford’s argument 
that Howard and Sharp included the exception provisions merely for 
warranty purposes.70 The court contrasted the prior reservations of royalty 
interests from the express exception of a three-fourths mineral interest in 
62. Pich v. Lankford, 302 S.W.2d 645, 648 (Tex. 1957) (citing Roberts v.
Robertson, 53 Vt. 690. (1881)). 
63. Roberts, 53 Vt. at 692.
64. Id. at 693.
65. Id.
66. Pich, 302 S.W.2d at 649 (citing Umscheid v. Scholz, 16 S.W. 1065 (Tex.
1891)). 
67. Umscheid, 16 S.W. at 1066.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1066–67.
70. Pich v. Lankford, 302 S.W.2d 645, 649–50 (Tex. 1957).
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the Howard and Sharp Deeds, explaining that construing the Howard and 
Sharp Deeds as excepting only the royalty interests for warranty purposes 
would be reforming the deeds.71 Restated, the court refused to construe the 
provisions as an exception of the prior reserved royalty interests because 
the Howard and Sharp Deed provisions were an express exception of a 
mineral interest.72 
Furthermore, though the Lankfords relied on Klein to support their 
position, the court expressly distinguished the case from Klein. In Klein, 
the subsequently excepted interest was identical to the prior reserved 
interest—a one-eighth mineral interest.73 As noted above, the prior 
reservation in this case was a royalty interest and the subsequently 
excepted interest was a mineral interest, which was critical to the court’s 
reasoning.74 
After all, the court reasoned that though the language of the Howard 
Deed did not expressly reserve an interest in favor of Howard,75 the 
language effectively excepted a three-fourths mineral interest from the 
grant.76 Moreover, because no one else in the chain of title had previously 
reserved said three-fourths mineral interest, the interest remained in 
Howard and ultimately vested in Pich via quitclaim deed. As a result, the 
court adjudged Pich the owner of an undivided three-fourths mineral 
interest in the subject lands, reversed both lower courts’ judgments, and 
remanded to the trial court for entry of a consistent judgment.77 
D. A False Recital Stating that a Mineral Interest Had Been Previously 
Conveyed, Without Words Expressing a Clear Intent to Reserve or to 
Except Said Interest, Will Be Construed as an Exception to Warranty 
Where a false recital appears at the beginning of the provision and 
does not clearly express an intent to reserve or except an interest from the 
grant, Texas courts will construe the provision as an exception to 
warranty.78 In Ladd v. DuBose, the Republic Insurance Company 
conveyed the subject lands to Porter and Bosworth on March 1, 1943, 
71. Id.
72. Id. at 650 (emphasis added).
73. See supra text accompanying note 29.
74. Pich, 302 S.W.2d at 650.
75. The court only discusses the interest of Howard, here, because once
Howard excepted the three-fourths mineral interest in the deed to Sharp, the recital 
in the deed from Sharp to Lankford that the grantor did not own a three-fourths 
mineral interest was no longer false. 
76. Pich v. Lankford, 302 S.W.2d 645, 650 (Tex. 1957).
77. Id.
78. Ladd v. DuBose, 344 S.W.2d 476, 479 (Tex. Civ. App.–Amarillo 1961,
no writ). 
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reserving a one-fourth mineral interest for a fifteen year term, provided 
that said interest shall terminate unless minerals are being produced in 
paying quantities at the end of the term.79 Porter and Bosworth 
subsequently conveyed the lands to J.L. Ladd et al., with no exceptions or 
reservations. Thereafter, on December 8, 1947, J.L. Ladd et al. conveyed 
the subject lands to Frank F. DuBose (hereinafter the Ladd Deed) with the 
following provisions: 
It is agreed and understood that a one-fourth mineral interest 
has been heretofore sold and it is further understood and agreed 
that a one-fourth mineral interest in said land together with the 
right of ingress and egress thereon, is reserved to the grantors, 
their heirs and assigns, and is excepted from this grant. It is the 
intention of this instrument to convey the vendee a one-half 
mineral interest, together will all surface rights.80 
At trial, the parties did not contest that Ladd clearly reserved a one-
fourth mineral interest in himself.81 However, the interest at issue was the 
outstanding one-fourth mineral interest depicted in the bold language 
above (previously reserved by Republic Insurance Company), which 
terminated on March 1, 1948, after there was no mineral production from 
the subject lands.82 
After the trial court adjudged DuBose to be the owner of the one-
fourth interest at issue, Ladd appealed, asserting that the deed 
unambiguously conveyed only the surface and a one-half mineral interest 
to DuBose and that the one-fourth interest at issue thus remained with the 
grantor (Ladd).83 Conversely, DuBose argued that the clause stating that 
Ladd’s intention was “to convey to vendee a one-half mineral interest, 
together with all surface rights,”84 was included only as a limitation of 
warranty, given that: (1) Ladd expressly reserved a one-fourth mineral 
interest in the deed; (2) Republic Insurance Company, at the time of the 
deed, still owned a term one-fourth mineral interest; and (3) Ladd, after 
his reservation, could only convey a present one-half mineral interest to 
DuBose.85 
The court began its analysis by defining the interests at issue. At the 
time of the Ladd Deed, dated December 8, 1947, Republic owned a 
79. Id. at 478.
80. Id. at 477–78 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 478. As shown by the italicized language in the above provision.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Ladd v. DuBose, 344 S.W.2d 476, 478 (Tex. Civ. App.–Amarillo 1961,
no writ). 
85. Id.
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determinable fee in one-fourth of the minerals. Ladd owned the future 
interest following the determinable fee (known as a possibility of reverter), 
which means that in the event that there was no mineral production in 
paying quantities on March 1, 1948, said one-fourth mineral interest would 
vest back into Ladd.86 
The issue, then, was whether the bold language in the provision above, 
together with the subsequent intention clause expressed an intent to 
reserve the possibility of reverter that followed Republic’s term interest, 
which Ladd owned at the time of the deed.87 
While noting that Ladd clearly reserved a separate one-fourth mineral 
interest in the deed, the court distinguished that clause from the clause at 
issue to reach its conclusion. The court reasoned that the terms “reserve” 
and “except” pertained only to Ladd’s additional one-fourth mineral 
reservation, and that the “agreed and understood” language in bold above 
did not indicate an intent to except or reserve the possibility of reverter.88 
Essentially, if Ladd had intended to except or reserve the possibility of 
reverter, he could have easily done so by utilizing the correct language, 
which he failed to do. The court briefly concluded that the intention clause 
following the exception and reservation paragraph was included only as a 
limitation of warranty.89 
Next, noting similarities between the facts of the current case and the 
out-of-state case of Whitman v. Harrison,90 the court explained that an 
exception must be construed as an exception to the warranty unless the 
grantor included the appropriate words in the instrument to express an 
intent to reserve the interest at issue.91 In Whitman, the grantor owned all 
of the surface rights of an eighty acre tract, with five mineral acres in fee, 
and a reversionary mineral interest as to sixty out of the eighty acres.92 
There, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the grantor’s conveyance 
of the entire eighty acres, subject to the prior mineral conveyances 
covering seventy-five acres, conveyed all of the grantor’s reversionary 
interest in the sixty acres because the grantor did not include any words 
expressing an intent to reserve the reversionary interest.93 
Returning to Texas authority, the court in Ladd cited several deed 
construction rules, all of which were variations of the Greatest Estate Rule 
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 478–79.
89. Id. at 479.
90. 327 P.2d 680 (Okla. 1958).
91. Ladd v. DuBose, 344 S.W.2d 476, 479 (Tex. Civ. App.–Amarillo 1961,
no writ) (citing Whitman, 327 P.2d at 682). 
92. Whitman, 327 P.2d at 681–82.
93. Whitman, 327 P.2d at 683.
2017] THE PICH EXCEPTION 57 
 
 
 
and the Construe Against the Grantor Rule to justify its position.94 First, 
when the conveyance is made by warranty deed, it “will be construed to 
confer upon the grantee the greatest estate that the terms of the instrument 
will permit.”95 Second, any doubt as to the proper construction of a deed 
is to be resolved against the grantor.96 Finally, “where a deed is capable of 
two constructions[,] the one most favorable to the grantee and which 
conveys the largest interest [that] the grantor could convey will be 
adopted.”97 
Interestingly, the court distinguished Ladd from Pich, explaining that 
the instrument in Pich included an express reservation, while the current 
case—with respect to the possibility of reverter—did not.98 It appears that 
the use of the word “reservation,” in the court’s analysis of Pich, was to 
use the word loosely, as the interest retained by the grantor in Pich was 
construed as an exception from the grant, not a reservation.99 While Ladd 
and Pich are fairly distinguishable, the court’s analysis of Ladd in relation 
to Pich left a bit to be desired. In the absence of a thorough court 
discussion, it could be helpful to seek guidance by reviewing the 
distinguishing facts of each case. In Pich, the exception appeared at the 
beginning of the provision and was separated from the false recital by a 
comma: “Save and Except an undivided three[-]fourths of the oil, gas and 
other minerals in, on and under said land, which have been heretofore 
reserved.”100 
Yet, in Ladd, the provision at issue did not include express reserve or 
except language regarding the one-fourth possibility of reverter; rather, the 
language explained that the parties understand that a one-fourth interest 
had been sold prior to the conveyance: 
It is agreed and understood that a one-fourth mineral interest has 
been heretofore sold and it is further understood and agreed that a 
one-fourth mineral interest in said land together with the right of 
ingress and egress thereon, is reserved to the grantors, their heirs 
and assigns, and is excepted from this grant.101 
                                                                                                             
 94. Ladd, 344 S.W.2d at 480. 
 95. Id. at 480 (citing Waters v. Ellis, 312 S.W.2d 231, 234 (Tex. 1958)). 
 96. Id. (citing Garrett v. Dils Co., 299 S.W.2d 904, 906 (Tex. 1957)). 
 97. Ladd v. DuBose, 344 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Tex. Civ. App.–Amarillo 1961, no 
writ) (citing Chestnut v. Casner, 42 S.W.2d 175, 178 (Tex. Civ. App.–Austin 1931, 
writ ref’d)). 
 98. Id. (emphasis added). 
 99. Pich v. Lankford, 302 S.W.2d 645, 650 (Tex. 1957) (emphasis added). 
 100. Id. at 646 (emphasis added). 
 101. Ladd, 344 S.W.2d at 477 (emphasis added). 
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Unlike Pich, the purported exception in Ladd is essentially a false 
recital appearing at the beginning of the provision that, according to the 
court, did not express a clear intent to except or reserve an interest from 
the grant.102 Ultimately, the court reasoned that crediting Ladd as reserving 
or excepting the possibility of reverter from the grant would be to credit a 
reservation by implication, which Texas law expressly forbids.103 Thus, 
the court adjudged DuBose to be the owner of an undivided three-fourths 
mineral interest in the lands at issue, being the one-half mineral interest 
expressly conveyed, plus the one-fourth possibility of reverter that had 
since merged into a fee mineral interest after the expiration of the fifteen 
year term.104 
E. An Exception Only of Prior Reserved Interests Will Not Effectuate an 
Exception in Favor of the Grantor, Even if There Are No Such Prior 
Reservations 
Similarly, where the false recital of a prior reservation or exception 
appears in the same clause as the purported exception, the provision will be 
construed as an exception to warranty only, and will not operate to except 
an interest in favor of the grantor.105 In Miller v. Melde, Allen conveyed the 
subject lands to K.R. Miller, with no exceptions or reservations.106 
Subsequently, Miller conveyed the subject lands to the Bergstroms 
(hereinafter the Miller Deed) with the following provision: “However, there 
is reserved and excepted in prior conveyances one-half . . . of the oil, gas 
and other minerals in or under said premises for a term of fifteen . . . years 
from the date of said reservation.”107 At trial, the court determined that 
Miller did not reserve any interest in the land.108 As a result, Miller 
appealed.109 
On appeal, Miller, relying on Pich, argued that he effectively reserved 
a one-half mineral interest in the land pursuant to the provision in the 
Miller Deed.110 However, the court disagreed, reasoning that the provision 
at issue did not reserve or except a mineral interest in clear and 
102. Id. at 478–79. 
 103. Ladd v. DuBose, 344 S.W.2d 476, 479 (Tex. Civ. App.–Amarillo 1961, 
no writ) (citing Sharp v. Fowler, 252 S.W.2d 153, 154 (Tex. 1952)). 
104. Id. at 480. 
105. Miller v. Melde, 730 S.W.2d 12, 13 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1987, no 
writ). 
106. Id. at 12. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 13. 
2017] THE PICH EXCEPTION 59 
 
 
 
unambiguous language.111 Moreover, the court distinguished the case from 
Pich, explaining that the Miller Deed only excepted from the grant the 
mineral interests that were “reserved and excepted in prior 
conveyances.”112 Because there were no prior reservations or exceptions 
in the chain of title, the court reasoned that Miller did not effectively 
except any interest from the grant.113 As a result, the court determined that 
Bergstrom acquired all of the mineral interest owned by Miller.114 
F. Conveyance Made “Subject to” a Purported Reservation in a Deed 
Restriction Instrument Will Not Effectuate a Reservation in Favor of the 
Grantor 
Likewise, where a conveyance is made “subject to” prior reservations 
in the chain of title, and the instrument itself does not express an intent to 
reserve or except an interest in favor of the grantor, Texas courts will 
construe the language as an exception to warranty.115 In Farm & Ranch 
Investors, Ltd. v. Titan Operating, LLC, Caldwell’s Creek, Ltd. (Caldwell) 
owned a sixty acre tract of land known as Caldwell’s Creek Addition 
(Addition).116 Thereafter, Caldwell filed a dedication and restrictions 
instrument in the county deed records covering said land.117 The 
instrument included the following restriction: “No oil drilling, oil 
development operations, oil refining, quarrying or mining operations of 
any kind shall be permitted upon or on any lot. All mineral rights shall 
belong and shall continue to belong to the limited partnership of 
Caldwell’s Creek, L[td].”118 
From 1994 to 1999, Caldwell conveyed, via warranty deed, lots out of 
the Addition to various parties.119 None of the deeds included an express 
mineral reservation;120 however, each deed included the following 
provision: “This conveyance is made subject to any and all easements, 
restrictions, and mineral reservations affecting said property that are filed 
                                                                                                             
 111. Miller v. Melde, 730 S.W.2d 12, 13 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1987, no 
writ). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Farm & Ranch Investors, Ltd. v. Titan Operating, LLC, 369 S.W.3d 679 
(Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2012, petition denied). 
 116. Id. at 680. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
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for record in the office of the County Clerk of Tarrant County, Texas.”121 In 
2005, Caldwell, believing itself to be the owner of all of the mineral estate 
of the Addition, purported to convey all of the mineral estate to Farm & 
Ranch Investors, Ltd. (Farm & Ranch).122 Later in 2008, Farm & Ranch 
sought to execute an oil and gas lease covering the Addition with Titan 
Operating, LLC (Titan).123 However, Titan believed that Farm & Ranch did 
not own any interest in the lands, and instead executed leases with the 
various grantees of the deeds from Caldwell.124 As a result, Titan sued Farm 
& Ranch in order to remove the cloud on title, and the trial court determined 
that Farm & Ranch did not own any mineral interest in the Addition.125 
On appeal, Farm & Ranch contended that: (1) the deed restrictions filed 
by Caldwell operated to reserve the mineral estate in favor of Caldwell; and 
(2) that the “subject to” language in the subsequent deeds effectively 
conveyed only the surface to the grantees of said deeds.126 In its first holding, 
the court explained that Caldwell did not reserve a mineral interest in the 
Addition because Caldwell already owned both the surface and the minerals 
at the time that Caldwell filed the dedication and restrictions instrument.127 
Citing precedent, the court noted that an owner of lands could not reserve in 
himself an interest in property that he already owns.128 
Moreover, although Farm & Ranch argued that the phrase stating that the 
mineral rights “shall continue to belong” to the limited partnership was a clear 
reservation, the court dismissed this argument on account that the instrument 
in question was not a conveyance or a lease, but was merely a dedication and 
deed restriction instrument, which thus could not reserve an interest.129 
In its second holding, the court determined that the phrase “shall 
continue to belong” could not be interpreted as a future reservation.130 
Instead, the court agreed with the trial court’s interpretation that the 
dedication and deed restrictions instrument would not operate to deprive 
Caldwell of the mineral interest that it owned at the time of the filing.131 
 121. Farm & Ranch Investors, Ltd. v. Titan Operating, LLC, 369 S.W.3d 679, 
680 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2012, petition denied). 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 680–81. 
126. Id. at 681. 
127. Farm & Ranch Investors, Ltd. v. Titan Operating, LLC, 369 S.W.3d 679, 
681 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2012, petition denied). 
 128. Id. (citing Reeves v. Towery, 621 S.W.2d 209, 213 (Tex. App.–Corpus 
Christi 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.)). 
129. Id. at 682. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
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The court then examined each of the deeds from Caldwell to the 
various other lot owners, noting that the language in each deed did not 
expressly reserve or except any interest, but rather stated that the 
conveyance was subject to any mineral reservations of record.132 The court 
further cited the reasoning of its sister court in a similar case, noting that 
“subject to” language is generally construed as a limitation of warranty, 
and not a reservation or exception in favor of the grantor.133 After 
analyzing the holding of its sister court and citing the Greatest Estate Rule, 
the court determined that the “subject to” provision in this case was 
included as an exception to warranty only.134 
Lastly, the court analyzed the effect of the “subject to” clause in 
context of the purported reservation in the deed restriction instrument. The 
court restated its holding that the deed restriction instrument did not 
reserve a mineral interest in favor of Caldwell, and thus reasoned that the 
case was akin to Miller, where the provision at issue only excepted prior 
reserved interests.135 Like Miller, the court reasoned that the deeds from 
Caldwell did not effectively reserve or except an interest in favor of 
Caldwell because: (1) the deed provisions merely made the conveyances 
subject to any mineral reservations of record; and (2) there were no 
mineral reservations of record.136 Thus, the court concluded that Farm & 
Ranch, as successor-in-interest to Caldwell, did not own any mineral 
interest in the subject lands.137 
G. The Term “Reserve” and/or “Except” is Not Requisite to 
Reserve/Except an Interest in Favor of the Grantor 
In Houchins v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., the court held that the terms 
“reserve” and/or “except” were not necessary in order to effectuate a 
mineral reservation/exception in favor of the grantor.138 By Warranty Deed 
dated February 2, 1994, Phillip H. Trew conveyed the subject lands to 
Darrell E. Houchins and Cynthia A. Houchins.139 The warranty deed 
included the following provision: 
                                                                                                             
 132. Id. at 682–83. 
 133. Farm & Ranch Investors, Ltd. v. Titan Operating, LLC, 369 S.W.3d 679, 
683 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2012, petition denied) (citing Wright v. E.P. 
Operating Ltd. P’ship, 978 S.W.2d 684, 688 (Tex. App.–Eastland 1998, petition 
denied)). 
 134. Id. at 683–84. 
 135. Id. at 684. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. No. 01-08-00273-CV, 2009 WL 3321406 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 
Oct. 15, 2009, petition denied) (memorandum opinion). 
 139. Id. at *1. 
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This conveyance is expressly made subject to any and all 
restrictions, covenants and easements, if any, relating to the 
hereinabove described property, but only to the extent they are still 
in effect, shown of record . . . and to all zoning laws, regulations 
and ordinances of municipal or other governmental authorities, if 
any, but only to the extent they are still in effect, relating to the 
hereinabove described property. This conveyance is also 
expressly subject to all restrictions, covenants and easements set 
forth in the Note and Deed of Trust executed and delivered to 
Grantor. To the extent that Grantor maintains any mineral rights 
to the subject property, Grantor expressly retains such mineral 
rights and exempts same from the conveyance herein. Grantees 
accept property in its ‘AS IS’ condition.140 
In 2001, Trew executed an oil and gas lease covering the subject lands, 
and the Devon Energy Production Company (Devon), as successor-in-
interest to the original lessee, prepared to drill for oil and gas on said 
lands.141 The Houchinses, claiming to be the owners of the mineral interest 
in the lands, denied Devon access to the lands; subsequently, Devon 
sued.142 At trial, the court granted Devon’s motion for summary judgment, 
holding that Trew unambiguously reserved all of the minerals in the 
subject lands, and the Houchinses appealed.143 
On appeal, the Houchinses relied on Klein and argued that the language 
stating that the Grantor “expressly retains [the] mineral rights to the subject 
property and exempts same from the conveyance” was merely an exception 
to warranty and did not operate to reserve an interest in favor of Trew.144 
The Houchinses further supported their argument by noting that the 
provision preceding the language excepted only easements and other 
restrictions of record.145 Further, the Houchinses argued that the clause 
should be construed in context of its surrounding language.146 In addition, 
the Houchinses contended that the use of “retain” and “exempt” was similar 
to Klein and did not express a clear intent to reserve the minerals.147 
In its analysis, the court began by distinguishing the case from Klein. 
It reasoned that Trew’s reference to a specific “[g]rantor” in the provision 
140. Id. (emphasis added). 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at *2. 
144. Houchins v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., No. 01-08-00273-CV, 2009 WL 
3321406, at *2 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 15, 2009, petition denied) 
(memorandum opinion). 
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at *3. 
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was unlike Klein—where the excepted interest was in favor of the “owner 
of said rights.”148 Instead, the court explained that when construing deed 
language as an exception or reservation, its objective is to determine the 
parties’ expressed intent within the four corners of the instrument.149 
Moreover, rather than attempting to discern the subjective intent of the 
parties, the court will examine all of the language within the deed to 
determine the intent of the parties as expressed by the instrument.150 
After a discussion of the above rules, the court held that the disputed 
language expressed a clear intent to reserve the mineral estate from the 
conveyance.151 The court noted that to hold otherwise would utterly 
disregard the language of the deed, which is contrary to the court’s role in 
a deed construction case.152 Furthermore, the court relied upon the 
dictionary definitions of “maintain” and “retain” to support its conclusion. 
Quoting both Black’s Law Dictionary and Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate 
Dictionary, the court held that the definition of “maintain” was to 
“continue in possession of (property, etc.),” and “retain” was “to keep in 
possession or use.”153 Therefore, the use of these words sufficiently 
expressed Trew’s intent to reserve the mineral estate in the lands.154 
In their final contention, the Houchinses argued that the deed was 
ambiguous and should thus be reformed. The court disagreed, stating that a 
mere disagreement over the interpretation of a deed provision does not 
render it ambiguous.155 Rather, in order to be ambiguous, the deed must be 
susceptible to more than one meaning, and each potential meaning must be 
reasonable.156 After holding that the deed in question was not ambiguous, 
the court concluded that Trew clearly retained the mineral estate in the 
lands.157 Thus, affirming the trial court’s holding on the matter.158 
148. Id. 
149. Id. (citing Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. 1991)). 
150. Houchins v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., No. 01-08-00273-CV, 2009 WL 
3321406, at *3 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 15, 2009, petition denied) 
(memorandum opinion). 
151. Id. at *4. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. Houchins v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., No. 01-08-00273-CV, 2009 WL 
3321406, at *4 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 15, 2009, petition denied) 
(memorandum opinion). 
157. Id. at *5. 
158. Id. 
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H. When a Deed Identifies the Excepted Interest by Providing the 
Recording Information for the Instrument Where the Interest was 
Originally Excepted or Reserved, the Exception Will Be Construed as an 
Exception to Warranty 
In Thomason v. Badgett, Dan Reese conveyed the subject lands to 
Kenneth Hopkins in 1996 (hereinafter the Reese Deed), reserving a one-
half mineral interest.159 Then, Hopkins conveyed the lands to Thomason 
and Lupton (hereinafter the Hopkins Deed) “save and except” the Reeses’ 
one-half mineral interest as shown in the Reese Deed.160 Next, Thomason 
and Lupton subdivided the lands and conveyed the lots to various 
parties.161 Each deed included one of the following clauses: 
SAVE AND EXCEPT: ALL OIL, GAS AND OTHER 
MINERALS AS RECORDED IN [the Reese Deed] AND [the 
Hopkins deed]. 
 
SAVE & EXCEPT: OIL, GAS AND OTHER MINERALS AS 
RECORDED IN [the Reese deed] AND [the Hopkins deed]. 
 
SAVE & EXCEPT: ALL OIL, GAS AND OTHER MINERALS 
AS RECORDED IN [the Reese deed] AND OTHER OIL, GAS 
AND MINERALS AS RECORDED IN [the Hopkins deed].162 
Thereafter, Thomason and Lupton leased the subject lands to Devon 
Energy Production Company (Devon), asserting that they owned an 
undivided one-half mineral interest in the lands.163 Devon then notified 
Thomason and Lupton that it was concerned that Thomason and Lupton 
did not own a mineral interest in the lands.164 Thomason and Lupton 
subsequently sued the current lot owners in a trespass to try title action.165 
The trial court granted motion for summary judgment in favor of the 
current owner, the Badgett family.166 As a result, Thomason and Lupton 
appealed.167 
                                                                                                             
 159. No. 02-12-00303-CV, 2013 WL 3488254, at *1 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 
July 11, 2013, petition denied) (memorandum opinion). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Thomason v. Badgett, No. 02-12-00303-CV, 2013 WL 3488254, at *1 
(Tex. App.–Fort Worth July 11, 2013, petition denied) (memorandum opinion). 
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On appeal, Thomason and Badgett cited Pich, arguing that although 
they did not expressly reserve a mineral interest, they effectively excepted 
a mineral interest from the grant in their favor.168 Moreover, Thomason 
and Lupton argued that while the Reese Deed reserved a one-half mineral 
interest, the majority of their deeds to the current landowners excepted 
“all” of the mineral estate, which effectively meant that Thomason and 
Lupton retained the remaining one-half mineral interest that they owned 
at the time of each conveyance.169 
The court ultimately disagreed with Thomason and Lupton, explaining 
first that the exception in the deeds to the current owners did not 
specifically describe the excepted interest, but rather only directed the 
reader to two prior deeds in the chain of title—the Reese and Hopkins 
Deeds.170 Further, the court reasoned that though the Reese Deed 
effectively reserved a one-half mineral interest, the Hopkins Deed only 
excepted the interest as reserved in the Reese Deed; so the Hopkins Deed 
did not reserve any interest in the lands.171 Thus, at the time of the deeds 
to the current lot owners, Reese owned 50% of the minerals, and 
Thomason and Lupton owned 50% of the minerals.172 Likening the case 
to Titan, the court determined that the effect of the language in the deeds 
from Thomason and Lupton to the current owners was to convey the 
mineral and surface estates of the lands subject to any prior recorded 
reservations, to-wit: the Reese reservation.173 
Finally, the court held that the use of the word “all” in the deeds to the 
current owners excepting “all oil, gas and other minerals as recorded” did 
not clearly express an intent for Thomason and Lupton to retain a mineral 
interest.174 The court reasoned that “all” did not necessarily mean 100% of 
the minerals, rather, it meant that the interest excepted from the 
conveyance was all of the interest as recorded in prior deeds.175 The court 
further noted that the language was unclear at best, in which case the 
language is to be construed against the grantor.176 As a result, the court 
168. Id. at *2. 
169. Id. at *3. 
170. Id. at *2. 
171. Thomason v. Badgett, No. 02-12-00303-CV, 2013 WL 3488254, at *2 
(Tex. App.–Fort Worth July 11, 2013, petition denied) (memorandum opinion). 
172. Id. 
 173. Id. (citing Farm & Ranch Investors, Ltd. v. Titan Operating, LLC, 369 
S.W.3d 679, 684 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2012, petition denied). 
174. Id. at *3. 
175. Id. (emphasis added). 
176. Id. 
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affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that Thomason and Lupton 
owned no interest in the subject lands.177 
I. The Griswold Extension of the Pich Exception 
The court in Griswold v. EOG Res., Inc., citing Pich as binding 
precedent, held that a clause saving and excepting an interest “heretofore 
reserved by predecessors in title” effectively excepted an interest in favor 
of the grantor.178 It reasoned that the provision at issue was a clear and 
unambiguous exception followed by a false recital.179 
In 1926, R. Allred and his wife conveyed the subject lands to J.H. 
Barker, reserving a one-half mineral interest.180 Thereafter, Rex Calaway 
received a foreclosure judgment against both Barker and Allred, such that 
the mineral estate and surface estate merged, and Calaway was vested with 
the land via constable’s deed pursuant to the foreclosure judgment.181 
Next, Calaway conveyed the subject lands to R.E. Stewart, with no 
reservations or exceptions.182 Ultimately, Dorothy Williams and Kathryn 
Wellington were vested with ownership of the lands, with no intervening 
mineral reservations or exceptions.183 Subsequently, Williams and 
Wellington conveyed the subject lands to James and Diana Caswell 
(hereinafter the Caswell Deed) with the following provision: “LESS, 
SAVE AND EXCEPT an undivided [one-half] of all oil, gas and other 
minerals found in, under[,] and that may be produced from the above 
described tract of land heretofore reserved by predecessors in title.”184 The 
Caswells then conveyed the subject lands to the Griswolds with an 
identical save and except provision as shown above.185 The Griswolds then 
leased the lands to EOG Resources, Inc. (EOG), and later brought suit after 
EOG paid the Griswolds based on a one-half mineral interest.186 At trial, 
the court granted EOG’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the 
Griswolds owned only a one-half mineral interest in the lands.187 
 177. Thomason v. Badgett, No. 02-12-00303-CV, 2013 WL 3488254, at *3 
(Tex. App.–Fort Worth July 11, 2013, petition denied) (memorandum opinion). 
178. 459 S.W.3d 713, 720 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth, 2015, petition denied). 
179. Id. 
180. Id. at 716. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. Griswold v. EOG Res., Inc., 459 S.W.3d 713, 716 (Tex. App.–Fort 
Worth, 2015, petition denied). 
185. Id. at 717. 
186. Id. at 716–17. 
187. Id. at 715–16. 
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On appeal, the Griswolds argued that the exception in the Caswell 
Deed was limited only to prior reservations in the chain of title, and that 
because there were no such prior reservations, all of the mineral estate 
passed to them via the deed.188 Contrarily, EOG argued that the provision 
clearly expressed an intent to except a one-half mineral interest, and the 
phrase “heretofore reserved by predecessors in title” was a false recital that 
did not alter the interest excepted from the grant.189 
After discussing the Greatest Estate Rule and Construe Against the 
Grantor Rule, the court restated the technical distinctions between a 
reservation and exception, further noting that a save-and-except clause can 
fail to pass title in some instances, at which point title to the excepted 
interest will remain in the grantor if the interest is not owned by a 
predecessor-in-title.190 
Furthermore, the court analogized the case with Pich, reasoning that 
the similarities between the facts of both cases render Pich binding 
authority on the matter.191 Like Pich, the court in Griswold explained that 
the Caswell Deed included a plain and unambiguous exception of a one-
half mineral interest, followed by a phrase purporting to state why the 
exception was made.192 In other words, the chain of title in Griswold 
conclusively showed that there were no effective prior mineral 
reservations from predecessors in title, as the only prior reservation had 
been extinguished in the foreclosure judgment.193 Despite that the chain of 
title conclusively negated the given reason for the exception, the court 
explained that “the giving of a false reason for an exception from a grant 
does not operate to alter or cut down the interest or estate excepted, nor 
does it operate to pass the excepted interest or estate to the grantee.”194 As 
a result, the court concluded that Williams and Wellington effectively 
excepted a one-half mineral interest in favor of themselves via the Caswell 
Deed, and affirmed the trial court’s judgment.195 
Though it is fairly clear that the Griswold court’s adherence to the 
ruling in Pich can be attributed mostly to the doctrine of stare decisis, it is 
still helpful to note the differences between the cases to understand the 
extension of the rule in Pich. In Pich, the provision at issue appeared as 
follows: “Save and Except an undivided three-fourths of the oil, gas and 
188. Id. at 718. 
189. Id. 
190. Griswold v. EOG Res., Inc., 459 S.W.3d 713, 718 (Tex. App.–Fort 
Worth, 2015, petition denied). 
191. Id. at 718–19. 
192. Id. at 720. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. (quoting Pich v. Lankford, 302 S.W.2d 645, 648 (Tex. 1957). 
195. Id. 
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other minerals in, on and under said land, which have been heretofore 
reserved.”196 Again, the court in Pich determined that this provision was a 
clear exception of a three-fourths mineral interest, followed by a false 
recital.197 Although the court did not emphasize the placement of the 
comma in the provision, it is clear that a comma separates the exception 
from the recital, which could have been a factor in the court’s reasoning. 
In Griswold, however, the provision at issue was as follows: “LESS, 
SAVE AND EXCEPT an undivided [one-half] of all oil, gas and other 
minerals found in, under[,] and that may be produced from the above 
described tract of land heretofore reserved by predecessors in title.”198 
Notably, the exception and false recital in the Griswold provision are not 
separated by a comma, but rather appear as the same general clause. Yet, 
despite this distinction, the courts in both Pich and Griswold reached the 
same conclusion. 
CONCLUSION 
For the practitioner, it is helpful to consider several factors when 
interpreting whether the provision at issue is a reservation, exception to 
warranty, or exception to grant. Context, diction, and overall sentence 
structure are imperative when interpreting these provisions. Generally, a 
reservation is the easiest to spot, yet it is important to remember that the 
term “reserve” is not strictly necessary to effectuate a reservation in favor 
of the grantor.199 
Next, when faced with “exception” language, the reader should 
examine the provision closely to determine if the provision is an exception 
to warranty or an exception to grant. Where the clause saves and excepts 
only the interests “as reserved in prior conveyances,” Texas courts will 
generally construe the provision as an exception to warranty.200 Likewise, 
where the exception provision excepts an identical interest as reserved in 
196. Pich, 302 S.W.2d at 646. 
197. Id. at 648. 
198. Griswold v. EOG Res., Inc., 459 S.W.3d 713, 716 (Tex. App.–Fort 
Worth, 2015, petition denied). 
 199. See e.g., Houchins v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., No. 01-08-00273-CV, 
2009 WL 3321406, at *4 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 15, 2009, petition 
denied) (memorandum opinion) (holding that grantor’s use of words “retain” and 
“exempt” clearly expressed an intent to reserve a mineral interest from the grant). 
 200. See generally Thomason v. Badgett, No. 02-12-00303-CV, 2013 WL 
3488254, at *2 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth July 11, 2013, petition denied) 
(memorandum opinion); Miller v. Melde, 730 S.W.2d 12, 13 (Tex. App.–Corpus 
Christi 1987, no writ); Ladd v. DuBose, 344 S.W.2d 476, 479 (Tex. Civ. App.–
Amarillo 1961, no writ). 
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a prior deed, courts are more likely to interpret the provision as an 
exception to warranty.201 
On the other hand, where the provision includes a clear and 
unambiguous exception of an interest, followed by a false recital 
purporting to state why the exception is being made, Texas law provides 
that: (1) the exception is from the grant; (2) the excepted interest will not 
pass to the grantee of the deed; and (3) the excepted interest will remain 
in the grantor if another party does not own it.202 In such an instance, it is 
important to know the context (e.g., the chain of title prior to the deed). 
Essentially, if the exception appears before the recital and the chain of title 
conclusively negates the recited reason for the exception, the recital is a 
“false recital” that will not alter the fact that the interest is excepted from 
the grant.203 Contrarily, where the structure of the provision is such that 
the false recital appears before the exception, the provision is more likely 
to be construed as an exception to warranty.204 Lastly, after a fact-intensive 
analysis of the provision at issue under the common law rules set forth 
above, the Greatest Estate Rule and the Construe Against the Grantor Rule 
can provide guidance, and can ultimately tip the scale in favor of the 
grantee of the deed when in doubt. 
 201. See generally Klein v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 67 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. Civ. 
App.–Beaumont 1934, writ granted), aff’d, 86 S.W.2d 1077 (Tex. 1935). 
 202. See generally Pich v. Lankford, 302 S.W.2d 645, 645 (Tex. 1957); 
Griswold, 459 S.W.3d 713. 
203. See Griswold, 459 S.W.3d at 720. 
204. See generally Miller, 730 S.W.2d 12. 
